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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The Court of Appeals in its decision has perhaps overlooked 
a number of critical facts, attributable in part to the complex 
nature of this case. It is an exceedingly complicated matter. 
Specifically , the Court of Appeals has more failed to recognize 
the fact that the principal on the primary construction Note was 
not paid out in full and in fact never disbursed. In deed that 
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Case No. 890108 
Priority 14(b) 
breach is the source of the ultimate failure of the construction 
project. The current language of the Opinion, for example, states: 
"We hold that C.F. is entitled to recover principal loan and 
interest accrued thereon, as provided in each of the three Notes, 
from the respective Note Makers." See Page 6 of the Opinion. The 
Court of Appeals has understandably overlooked the fact that the 
principal on the construction loan was never lent out or disbursed 
in full. It certainly doe not make any sense to hold the 
Defendants liable for money they never received. Indeed, it is the 
understanding from counsel of the Appellant that the Respondents 
are liable for all money on the Note whether received or not 
received. This clearly cannot be the holding of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Second, the Opinion on page 6 also states that "1. Appellees 
were not entitled to recover damages for the breach of C.F." In 
fact, the Court had found that C.F. had breached the terms of the 
Contract, but the price of a fully developed lot would be too 
speculative. It is clear from the evidence in the Memorandum 
Decisions of Judge Raymond S. Uno that there should be damages, but 
that the damages would be difficult to ascertain. An appropriate 
manner of dealing with this case would be to remand and allow for 
additional testimony regarding some form of damages. It is clear 
that Markwest and Howard Hucks had been damaged and that an offset 
should occur. The Trial Court merely found that that was a 
speculative amount. It would turn justice on its head if the quid 
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pro quo envisioned by the Court in order to deal with the 
speculative nature of the damages should overturned so as to ignore 
one person's damages when they clearly exist, and reward the other 
side because of the other side's misfortune in this regard. 
Consequently, this matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
further findings regarding the damages that the Hucks sustained. 
In addition, the Opinion does not address the facts cited by 
the Memorandum Decision of Judge Uno that Howard Hucks no longer 
had the ability to legitimately seek alternate financing. 
Consequently, the holding in Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association vs. Cox: 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981) can be and should be 
distinguished upon the grounds that it would be impossible for 
Howard Hucks to have mitigated his damages by finding alternate 
financing. The Court of Appeals should therefore consider the 
effect of someone in the position of Howard Hucks and Markwest, who 
no longer having the ability to seek alternate financing, would 
therefore be denied an offset for damages caused by a lender's 
breach of an agreement. 
Finally, the Opinion does not address the nature of the 
overall financing scheme. The notes were restricted by various 
contingencies and conditions that were not met. There were 
additional agreements and conditions regarding these Notes which 
have not been dealt with either in the Opinion or the Briefs, but 
were dealt with by Judge Raymond S. Uno. The Notes should be 
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viewed only in the context of these later agreements which modified 
and made contingent their demand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent respectfully suggests to the Court of Appeals 
that it may have overlooked the fact that its holding requires 
Howard Hucks and Markwest to pay for all monies received on the 
Notes and not merely the amounts that were disbursed. The Court 
of Appeals should certainly modify its holding to require only the 
repayment of funds that were actually disbursed. To do otherwise 
would be a severe injustice. 
Second, the Respondent would emphasize the fact that it was 
found to have been damaged by C.F.'s breach of the Contract, but 
that the Court did not feel obliged to deal with the uncertainties 
and difficulties of ascertaining how much would have been recovered 
on a sale of the property. Certainly some fund would have, in 
addition to what was received, at forecloser been produced from the 
completion of the project. The matter should be remanded to the 
Court in order to determine what kind of damages should be provided 
to offset whatever damages Commercial Finance may have. 
Thirdly, Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox 
should be distinguished on one essential element: The Respondents 
Howard Hucks and Markwest were unable and it was impossible for 
4 
them to seek alternate financing under the circumstances. The 
Respondents should not be so severely penalized for not seeking 
alternative financing when it is obvious under the circumstances 
that that would be an utter and complete waste of time. 
Fourth and finally, the Court of Appeals should re-evaluate 
this extremely complex set of facts in the context of the various 
contingencies and conditions established by the parties regarding 
these Notes and duties of each of the parties. These facts have 
not been dealt with at any extent by the Opinion. An adequate 
regard for them may in fact change the Court's Opinion regarding 
this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE APPELLANT COMMERCIAL FINANCE DID NOT 
DISBURSE OR GIVE TO RESPONDENTS THE ENTIRE AMOUNT 
OF THE NOTE AND THE RESPONDENTS CANNOT THEREFORE BE LIABLE 
FOR MONIES THEY HAVE NEVER RECEIVED BECAUSE OF A 
BREACH OF THE APPELLANT 
This Argument is simply to emphasize the fact that the 
Opinion, as it now stands, requires the Respondents to pay the 
Appellants the full amount of the three (3) construction Notes, a 
staggering sum, in spite of the fact that the Appellants never paid 
the full amount of the Note. Appellant, infact, breached the 
Agreement by their failure to pay beyond a certain amount. 
Communications from counsel for the Appellant have in fact conveyed 
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this fact but as Judge Uno pointed out on page 17 of his Memorandum 
Decision "but in view of the foregoing facts, they cannot sue for 
money that they never paid out." It is indeed an inappropriate and 
injustate of facts if Commercial Finance is permitted to sue for 
money that it never paid out and that it was breaching the terms 
of a Contract and Agreement by not paying out. They would doubly 
have benefited from their wrongdoing. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should require a remand to 
determine what amounts were actually paid or to simply incorporate 
what evidence was proffered as to what amounts were paid. 
II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER 
TO DISCOVER WHAT HOWARD HUCKS' AND MARKWESTfS 
DAMAGES ACTUALLY WERE 
The nature of Judge Uno's Judgment, after he had reviewed all 
the facts and a three-day trial, amounted to finding that 
Commercial Finance had breached the Agreement and that Howard Hucks 
and Markwest had been damaged. They lost an entire development, 
all chance for profits and any opportunity to pay off on these 
Notes. However, Judge Uno opted for a more equitable resolution 
of the matter by finding that the amounts that may have been due 
on the Notes were offset by the Appellant's breach. A simple 
solution to a complex problem. However, it is clear that Howard 
Hucks and Markwest were damaged by their inability to finish the 
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project. They would have had a greatly enhanced development 
project available for sale if it could have been completed. It was 
clear that it was in large part, Commercial Finance's fault for the 
failure of it to be completed. That has damaged Howard Hucks and 
Markwest. The current Opinion makes no accommodation for that 
fact. It would be just and appropriate that some account be given 
to Markwest and Howard Hucks for the damages that they did receive. 
The Trial Court was beset with an extremely difficult problem of 
finding damages. Testimony and evidence was presented by the 
Respondents regarding prices and damages, but the Trial Court chose 
to take another alternative. The Respondents should not be 
penalized because of the Trial Court's choice in remedies. 
Finally, Commercial Finance would be able to benefit from 
their improper behavior, and Howard Hucks and Markwest would be 
victimized by Commercial Finance's unilateral decision to stop 
giving funds to construction project, used to develop the property. 
It is certainly undeniable that the value of the* property would 
have been enhanced if construction would have continued, even if 
profits may not have been found. It is not speculative that the 
value of the property would have been enhanced by continued work. 
Therefore, justice requires that this matter be remanded to find 
what the damages of Markwest and Howard Hucks would have been. 
Otherwise, Commercial Finance would be rewarded for their wrongful 
actions and Howard Hucks and Markwest will be stuck in a Catch-
22. 
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Ill 
THE FAILURE TO FIND ALTERNATE FINANCING 
IS EXCUSABLE WHEN IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET 
ALTERNATE FINANCING 
The rule in Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox 
was basically that failure to seek alternate financing sources 
preclude special damages, including loss profits, by the damaged 
individual. The Respondents would point out that the evidence and 
Memorandum Decision in that trial indicated that seeking alternate 
financing would have amounted to tilting at windmills. It is a 
basic principal of contract law that a person should not be 
required to carry out or attempt things that are impossible. It 
would be elevating form over substance to require Howard Hucks and 
Markwest to seek alternate financing under these circumstances and 
then arbitrarily impose a penalty on them for recognizing the 
impossibility of seeking alternate financing. Quite simply, the 
Court should imply a requirement of reasonableness into seeking 
alternate financing. Evidence should be permitted upon remand to 
find out whether a reasonable person would have pursued alternate 
financing considering their dire financial circumstances. 
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IV 
THE DAMAGES IN THE COX CASE WERE SPECIAL DAMAGES, 
THE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE INCLUDE DAMAGES NOT REQUIRING 
SPECIAL DAMAGES 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion includes in its decision the 
position that, under Cox, a failure to pursue alternate financing 
preclude special damages, including loss profits. However, the 
holding of the Appeals Court is overbroad in that it fails to 
recognize that the damages of Markwest and Howard Hucks includes 
damages that do not include profits. This means that Howard Hucks 
and Markwest should be allowed to produce what the reasonable 
market value of the property would have been if they were allowed 
to complete it. This would not include such amounts for damages 
which may have been found by discovering very favorable buyers. 
However, damages should include the reasonable increase in value 
caused by the completion of the project. That is clearly the 
holding in Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox. 
V 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION DOES NOT CONSIDER 
THE CONDITIONS AND CONTINGENCIES ESTABLISHED 
BY THE PARTY REGARDING THE NOTES AND DISBURSEMENTS 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion fails to take into count the 
various conditions and contingencies agreed to by the parties over 
the term of the construction and Note. Without this information, 
it is unable to analyze the entire matter completely. The Trial 
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Court did in fact make a number of findings regarding this matter. 
However, the Opinion simply deals with the blank aspects of 
the Notes and the breach by Commercial Finance, A proper 
disposition of this matter should be a remand that incorporates 
what these conditions and contingencies were. As it stands, the 
Opinion by the Court of Appeals does not deal with these issues 
whatsoever. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents respectfully request that the Court of Appeals 
set this matter for resubmittal and hearing upon the issues above 
mentioned. In the alternative, the Respondents request that that 
the Opinion and holding modified to provide for a remand based upon 
the points made by the Respondents above. Specifically, the 
Respondents request that the Court of Appeals remand to find what 
amounts were actually disbursed, what the damages of Howard Hucks 
and Markwest were. Finally, the Respondent would request an 
affirmation of the Judgment based upon the fact that it was 
impossible for Markwest and Howard Hucks to find alternative 
financing or that their damages, not including loss profits, would 
exceed the value disbursed by Commercial Finance. 
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